The forward march of democracy halted? by Brooke, Christopher R
                          Brooke, C. R. (2012). The forward march of democracy halted?. Renewal,
20(2-3), 143-145.
Link to publication record in Explore Bristol Research
PDF-document
University of Bristol - Explore Bristol Research
General rights
This document is made available in accordance with publisher policies. Please cite only the published
version using the reference above. Full terms of use are available:
http://www.bristol.ac.uk/pure/about/ebr-terms.html
Take down policy
Explore Bristol Research is a digital archive and the intention is that deposited content should not be
removed. However, if you believe that this version of the work breaches copyright law please contact
open-access@bristol.ac.uk and include the following information in your message:
• Your contact details
• Bibliographic details for the item, including a URL
• An outline of the nature of the complaint
On receipt of your message the Open Access Team will immediately investigate your claim, make an
initial judgement of the validity of the claim and, where appropriate, withdraw the item in question
from public view.
The forward march of democracy
halted?
Contesting Democracy: Political Ideas in Twentieth-
Century Europe 
Jan-Werner Müller
YALE UNIVERSITY PRESS, 2011
Reviewed by Christopher Brooke
There may be some readers of this journal who think like this: that 1945-73 was a ‘golden
age of social democracy’ in Western Europe, which experienced a flowering of democratic
politics in the wake of the fascist catastrophe; that some time during the 1970s the
‘forward march of labour’ was ‘halted’, in this country, at least, and there has been a ‘crisis
of social democracy’ bound up with the ascendancy of Thatcherism pretty much ever
since. Indeed, the very title of this journal – Renewal – is a nod to something like this
narrative. People who think things like this may also be the kind who think that ideas have
always played a greater role in the life of the left than they have on the right, and that this
is particularly true when we compare the extremes of the political spectrum, communism
and fascism; and, further, that with the striking exceptions of these particular political
religions, twentieth-century politics in Europe has been a largely secular affair. And while I
very much doubt that Jan-Werner Müller had such a hypothetical reader of Renewal in
mind as he was working on his excellent new history of political ideas in twentieth-century
Europe, he might as well have been writing for precisely such a person, as he repeatedly
seeks to challenge views like these – not because Contesting Democracy is any kind of
contribution to a distinctively right-wing historiography, but because with a look back at
the twentieth century from our own vantage point early in the twenty-first, this kind of bog-
standard social democratic or secularist story seems to miss out quite so much of what is
clearly very important, and fails to make sense of so much of what actually happened.
The thinker who above all anchors Müller’s explorations of twentieth-century political
ideas is the German sociologist Max Weber, who died in 1920 and who worried about the
future of free individuality in a necessarily bureaucratised society; of responsible political
action in a disenchanted world lacking shared collective meanings; and of stable liberal
regimes in a rapidly democratising continent. The older liberalism was discredited – it had
been shown to be hopelessly naïve in the run-up to the crisis of 1914 (which did for the
British Liberal Party), and its cherished principle of national self-determination after the War
seemed to demand an ‘unmixing of peoples’, which ‘often translated into invitations to
physical or, at least, psychological violence: threats, bullying, forced deportation and even
killing’ (p. 22). Another thinker to whom Müller returns repeatedly in his book is the arch-
anti-liberal Georges Sorel (1847-1922), who wrote of the crucial place occupied by myth in
political life, and who found admirers on both left and right: the syndicalists, for example,
with their myth of the general strike, or the fascists, with their myth of the nation.
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While Müller traces out György Lukács’s long revolutionary career from 1918 to 1956,
he is not terribly interested in the arguments that the Marxists might have conducted
among themselves: Rosa Luxemburg appears only fleetingly (p. 56), the Trotskyists
scarcely feature at all. Rather than approaching Bolshevism through any kind of analysis of
international political economy, Müller’s account of the Russian Revolution is framed by
Weber’s opinion that socialism meant universal bureaucratisation and Lenin’s creation of a
remarkable new political instrument for the pursuit of his goals, the vanguard party. (Lenin
himself remarked (p. 35) that ‘it is impossible to differentiate a political question from an
organisational one’). Stalinism is then treated largely as a collection of successful tech-
niques of organisation and domination separated from any particular intellectual content –
a matter of ‘what works’, to use a more familiar recent political idiom. But if Müller de-
emphasises the role of ideas among the communists, he leans the other way when he
turns his attention to the far right. Benito Mussolini’s supporters drew variously on strands
they found in Sorel, futurism, and corporatism, for example, and one of Italy’s leading
philosophers, Giovanni Gentile, became a sophisticated apologist for the new regime. And
although the Nazis were less interested in the contribution that intellectuals might make to
their new order, and much of their own thinking was patently all over the place, they took
their racism – what Müller calls their ‘biological determinism’ – very seriously indeed.
A theme that Müller pursues throughout Contesting Democracy is the idea of
‘remaking souls’ – that what ideologues sought was the transformation of human beings in
order to fit them to, and thereby also to make viable, the different kinds of social order they
advocated. The totalitarians of left and right were obviously playing this game – Müller has
some fun juxtaposing Lenin, who wanted to turn Russians into Germans, with Gramsci,
who wanted Italians to become Americans – but they were by no means the only ones.
The Swedish social democrats appear in this account as the victors in a Gramscian war of
position, reshaping the national culture from the 1930s around a remarkably successful
electoral project, squarely built around the cross-class alliance between workers and
peasants that the Marxists had tried to realise elsewhere. But this social democratic model
was not really available for export: Sweden was in an unusually advantageous position in
the inter-war period, with no deep constitutional conflicts, and – apart from the Åland
Islands – no significant national minorities (p. 67). And Müller emphasises the dark side of
Swedish social democracy: the eugenics policy through which thousands of Swedish
women were compulsorily sterilised over four decades in pursuit of a new kind of national
community.
It may be true that the working class often does well in the aftermath of war – the NHS
of 1948, for example, following on from victory in 1945. But outside Britain, the working
class emerged from the Second World War in a pretty battered condition, and the post-war
order in continental Western Europe was built on the foundations of a new cross-class
alliance to exclude it from political power. This was the entente between the middle class
and the peasantry, held together in Germany and Italy by the ideology we know as
Christian Democracy, and its victory is really the focal point of Müller’s book. What he
wants to emphasise is the historic significance of the reconciliation between the Catholic
Church and what we might call the revolutionary tradition of 1789. Even if the Vatican itself
tried to keep its options on the hard right open, when it sought to prevent a ban on the
Italian Social Movement (p. 147), ‘Christian Democrats in post-war Europe were no longer
in the business of grudgingly and resentfully accommodating the modern world – Christian
Democrats really became democrats’ (p. 135). And the democratic ideology they fashioned
– the key propagandist being Jacques Maritain, with inspiration from the ‘personalism’ of
Emmanuel Mounier – ‘embraced human rights as indispensable to a proper Catholic view
of the world’ (ibid.). (Once again, liberalism was at a low ebb, this time widely regarded as
too relativistic, as theories of natural law enjoyed a recrudescence). 
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The new post-war regimes were certainly democratic, but they were crafted by men
who believed that inter-war liberal parliamentary politics had facilitated the rise of the
fascists, and they sought stability by limiting democracy. Legislatures were weakened,
judicial oversight and administrative agencies were strengthened, and constitutional courts
beyond the reach of democratic majorities were erected to safeguard individual rights in
the new political order. The inter-war ‘trenchocracy’ gave way to post-war technocracy
with what Müller calls the triumph of ‘a new, chastened Weberian politics’ (p. 129). It could
also be seen as opening the way to a new kind of Sorelian politics, too. Alcide De Gaspari,
the first Christian Democratic prime minister in Italy, remarked in a speech that ‘some said
that the European federation is a myth’. It’s true, he said, ‘it is a myth in the Sorelian
sense’. But, he went on to ask the Senate, ‘Do you prefer the myth of dictatorship, the
myth of power, the myth of one nation’s flag, even if it is accompanied by heroism?’ (p.
142). The European Economic Community of the 1950s – nowadays, the European Union –
was the expression of such a myth, and it was also yet another institution for limiting
national democratic sovereignty, built around two policies that reflected the dominant class
alliance at the heart of the new European order – a common market for the bourgeoisie,
and extensive subsidies for agricultural small-holders. (The other dominant Sorelian myth
of our times, that of human rights, took institutional form in the same decade as the
European Convention on Human Rights). 
Two final chapters explore the twin challenges this Christian Democratic order faced
(as well as the disintegration of the Eastern bloc). First, there is the one we associate with
‘the 1960s’ in general and ‘1968’ in particular, a radical challenge directed against the
democratic limits of post-war regimes. This was a political assault which failed, but which
– partly as a by-product, partly as a backlash – catalysed the remarkable social transfor-
mations associated above all with feminism and gay liberation. Second, there is the
neo-liberal advance that made significant gains from the 1970s, and which – certainly in
Britain, but not only in Britain – changed the ways in which states went about the business
of political economy. But even here, Müller stresses the limits of neo-liberal success.
Margaret Thatcher herself remarked that ‘economics are the method; the object is to
change the heart and soul’, aligning her project with the ambitions of the inter-war
doctrines considered earlier, and there are good reasons to think that she never really
achieved this goal. In short, the fundamentals of Christian Democratic Europe have
persisted down to the present day – and it is that technocratic order of constrained
national democracy that is being tested as never before in the crucible of the crisis that
swirls around the eurozone today.
Christopher Brooke is Lecturer in Politics in the School of Sociology, Politics, and
International Studies at the University of Bristol. He is the author of Philosophic Pride:
Stoicism and Political Thought from Lipsius to Rousseau (Princeton University Press, 2012).
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